Conflict in Eastern Congo: “When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.”
The conflict in Eastern DRC has its roots in the country's colonial past, the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, and the subsequent influx of refugees and armed groups. The region's rich natural resources, including minerals like coltan, gold, and diamonds, have also contributed to the ongoing violence. As of May 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda are engaged in ongoing peace negotiations aimed at resolving the conflict in Eastern Congo, particularly concerning the M23 rebel group. These talks are being facilitated by the United States and Qatar, with the goal of reaching a formal agreement by mid-June. Talks reflect new geopolitical realities, where sovereignty is violated with impunity by Rwanda, whilst USA is turning inwards and looking for new proxies for its immigration policy to deport people out. How can trust be built between Rwanda and Congo when there is no trust at all between the administrations of Presidents Kagame and Tshisekedi?
"Rwanda's security posture in relation to the DRC is a subject of significant international scrutiny and controversy."
A prevailing view is that Rwanda's actions are driven by a combination of legitimate security concerns, particularly regarding the FDLR, and a significant desire to secure economic benefits from the mineral-rich eastern DRC. Rwanda's security posture in relation to the DRC is a subject of significant international scrutiny and controversy. Despite official denials, there are widespread reports from UN experts, international media, and various governments indicating a substantial Rwandan military presence within eastern DRC. Rwanda often justifies any military activities near the border as part of a "defensive posture" against threats originating from the DRC, particularly the FDLR. However, reports of Rwanda deploying advanced weaponry, including missile systems and drones , suggest a more significant and strategically planned military involvement in the region.
Rwanda aims to neutralize the threat posed by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a Hutu extremist group that took part in the Rwandan Genocide and is currently operating in the DRC. Rwanda accuses the DRC of supporting the FDLR. In fact there has been collusion between FARDC (Congolese army) and FDRL. By supporting the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group in the DRC, Rwanda is able to exert influence over the region and secure its interests. New Trump administration offers Kigali new prospects for its tried and tested "being useful and efficient" -strategy that has so well worked out in the past whilst shaming West for not preventing the 1994 genocide. This is done by proving itself a useful partner in Trump's immigration goals - mainly rendering foreigners from the US to Rwanda and there are indications of that happening already. This might buy political cover for Kigali in talks between DRC and Rwanda and in the UN Security Council, and also lead to sanctions relief.
Rwanda's invasion of Eastern Congo, supported by the M23 rebels, has sent its relations with Western powers into turmoil after they condemned the violation of the sovereignty of its neighbor. Congo is about the size of Western Europe and exceptionally rich in natural resources. The rebels control large areas of strategic importance in the east of the country. The region is home to numerous mines that are strategically important for world trade. Neighboring Uganda and Burundi occupy areas of Congo close to their borders, and there are also peacekeepers from the UN, which have time and again proven to be ineffective and costly to the international community.
Due to the sanctions, the M23 rebels have difficulty administering the areas they have seized - banking is difficult to start and local taxes are high. Rwanda has also committed not providing military support to M23, and future will tell if Rwanda keeps it's promise in that respect. It probably will maintain support to M23 in all other aspects, however.
The rebels' goal is to establish dialogue with the central government in Kinshasa. Rwanda supports this goal and has pushed for it in US-brokered negotiations. So far, the Kinshasa administration has not agreed to this and apparently fears, quite rightly, that Rwandan President Kagame's goal is simply to overthrow the current President Tshisekedi and bring to power in Kinshasa a regime that is in line with Rwanda's power-political goals in the Great Lakes region. The EU sanctions seem like a small touch, and God knows what Macron and Kagame discussed in Paris on May 7, 2025: what kind of secret deals possibly were made. For Rwanda France is an important country also in terms of getting political cover when needed.
Rwanda's military actions and alleged support for the M23 indicate that its approach to security in the DRC involves more than just diplomatic solutions, suggesting a complex strategy that may include the use of force or proxy warfare to achieve its objectives. Rwanda is a very authoritarian state, where the opposition has been defeated and where opponents of the regime are being pursued with brutal means, even abroad. Rwanda's actions in Congo have a long tradition and Rwanda has considered it its "right" to interfere in Congo's affairs continuously. The strategy chosen now resembles in a certain way what, for example, Turkey is doing in the areas it has conquered in Syria. It is preparing a permanent presence to secure its interests without caring about the sovereignty of the other state. The presidents of Turkey and Rwanda have close relations and their actions as authoritarian dictators are otherwise very similar to each other. In Turkey's case there is real occupation by Turkish forces, and in Rwanda's case a proxy - the M23 and it's political wing Coalition of Congo River Basin, with a hidden Rwandese hand in the shadows always very much nearby.
"When dealing with Rwandans, it is always very wise to check what they say with what is actually happening on the ground."
