Sudan’s civil war is a regional proxy fight and the West is on the sidelines. Sudan is unraveling. A brutal civil war has plunged the country into an abyss.
But this isn’t just an internal power struggle. Regional players are fanning the flames. Egypt has thrown its weight behind the SAF. The United Arab Emirates is widely believed to be supporting the RSF. Saudi Arabia, while officially calling for peace, has its own interests in how this ends. Sudan has become a proxy battleground in a broader contest for influence across the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
The reality is that influencing the conflict would require putting pressure on U.S. partners like Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia—an uncomfortable proposition, particularly at a time when relationships with those governments are already strained or strategically sensitive.
And then there’s the bigger question: what are the West’s actual interests in Sudan? Beyond humanitarian concern and human rights rhetoric, there’s little clear strategic incentive to act. For now, there seems to be no appetite for deeper engagement—and even less clarity about what effective action would look like.
To many Sudanese watching their country burn, the West’s response looks more like performance than policy. The theater continues. Who it’s really for is anyone’s guess.
Picture: At the heart of the devastation is Khartoum, the capital and symbolic heart of Sudan, now shattered. Once a bustling metropolis at the confluence of the Blue and White Niles, Khartoum has become a ghost city, emptied by shelling, looting, and street-by-street warfare.
As June 2025 draws near, the prospect of a ceasefire—let alone meaningful peace negotiations—remains distant. Hemetdi is reportedly "absent without leave", while his brother wages a fierce campaign to wrest control of El Fasher, the final government stronghold in Darfur province. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appears resolute in his pursuit of a military solution, intent on vanquishing the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) through force rather than diplomacy. The conflict is dominated by these two principal actors—the Sudanese Armed Forces led by General al-Burhan and the RSF—yet both of them are aligned with constellation of affiliated broadly aligned groupings.
Pictured: Khartoum is Sudan's largest city and capital, home to over 5 million people before the war. Khartoum has largely become a ghost town, with entire neighborhoods in ruins from airstrikes, artillery fire and looting. Infrastructure, hospitals, museums and schools have been badly damaged or completely destroyed, leaving behind a civilian population struggling in the midst of the crisis.
The Janjaweed, once a notorious militia terrorizing Darfur, has now transformed into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a powerful paramilitary group in Sudan. Like a dog turned against its own master, the RSF—originating from the Janjaweed—has begun aggressively challenging and destabilizing the very Sudanese government and people it was once allied with, biting its owner by inciting violence, undermining state authority, and fueling internal conflict. This shift reveals a tragic irony: a force born from government-backed militias that has now become a source of chaos and oppression within Sudan itself.
Pictured: Sudanese women who sell coffee and tea on the streets, prepare the drinks on charcoal stoves in small street kitchens, serving customers fresh ginger tea or traditional spiced coffee. This work is a source of independent livelihood for many women, but they also often work without protection in the heat or amidst the dangers of conflict.
Iran has long leveraged Sudan as a strategic partner to smuggle weapons, support extremist groups, and extend its regional influence, using the country as a transit hub for arms to proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah. During Sudan’s civil war starting in 2023, Tehran reasserted its role by supplying combat drones to the Sudanese Armed Forces, intensifying the conflict and challenging Gulf-backed factions. Iran’s involvement aims to secure access to the Red Sea, undermine Sunni Arab rivals, and expand its asymmetric warfare capabilities. This malign influence deepens Sudan’s instability and risks broader regional escalation.
Pictured: In Sudan, public water tanks, or zeers, are often located on roadsides or in village centers and are free community water points. They are carried by hand, animals or vehicles and provide a vital source of drinking water, especially in areas where tap water is not available.
Years ago, Gérard Prunier astutely observed—some two decades ago, as the Darfur conflict raged and the Janjaweed militias terrorized the region with rape, arson, and slaughter—that the violence would inevitably spread to Sudan’s capital. At that time, South Sudan was still part of Sudan, and the National Congress Party (NCP) held power, appearing as cunning chessmasters, always seemingly a step ahead of the perpetually ineffectual international community and their tribal rivals in both the south and Darfur. His insight was prescient then, and remains profoundly accurate to this day.
Sudan increasingly resembles the DRC (Democratic Republic of the Congo) day by day, as both countries have endured prolonged civil wars, political instability, and weak governance structures that have led to widespread humanitarian crises, refugee flows, and regional chaos; like in the DRC, conflicts between different ethnic and political groups in Sudan are tearing the country apart, hindering peace processes and economic development, while resource exploitation and corruption deepen societal problems, making Sudan an increasingly chaotic and vulnerable state.
